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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE SANDOVAL, individually
and as Guardian Ad Litem for
his minor children, LAVATO
SANDOVAL, SHAWNIELLE SANDOVAL,
and DANIELLE SANDOVAL,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
IDA TSOSIE SMITH,

Case No. 20648

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the trial judge ruled correctly in
determining that as a matter of law the defendant was not
negligent, that reasonable minds could not differ on the
issue, and in directing a verdict for the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought by the plaintiff/appellant,
Wayne Sandoval, of behalf of himself personally and in
his capacity as Guardian Ad Litem on behalf of his three
minor children.

Appellants are seeking damages from the

defendant/respondent, Ida Tsosie Smith, for the wrongful
death of their wife and mother, Virginia Sandoval.

When plaintiffs rested their case, the defendant
moved for a directed verdict in compliance with Rule 50 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Counsel for the

defendant based his motion upon the grounds that plaintiffs
had not proven a prima facie case and specifically had
failed to prove negligence as against the defendant.
The Court held that based upon the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs, "as a matter of law the
defendant was not negligent and reasonable minds cannot
differ on the issue.

Accordingly the defendant's Motion

for a Directed Verdict is granted."

(R. 151). Plaintiffs

have now appealed from the granting of that motion.
The plaintiffs1 decedent was killed in a
pedestrian/auto accident which occurred at approximately
11:00 p.m. on the 29th day of May, 1982f on U.S. Highway
89, south and east of Kanab, Utah.

(R. 5, 9).

The Sandovals originated their journey that day
from their home in Castle Dale, Utah.

(R. 201) . During

the hours prior to the collision, Mrs. Sandoval had been
behaving in such a manner that her husband considered her
confused and irrational.

(R. 241, 242). At one point,

Mrs. Sandoval indicated "she was about ready to leave
Mr. Sandoval for good".

(R. 241)* During the trip,

Mrs. Sandoval stated repeatedly that she was going to
die.

The Sandovals argued concerning her continual

comments about dying.

(R. 202, 203). Eventually,
-2-

Mr, Sandoval decided to let his wife drive, hoping that
that would occupy her so she would stop talking about her
death.

(R. 203) . They stopped to buy beer in Kanab, and

Mrs. Sandoval drove from that location.

(R. 201).

The highway at the point of the accident consists
of two 12-foot traffic lanes with a dividing line down the
center.

A six-foot wide parking lane borders the right of

each traffic lane with an approximate six-foot gravel
shoulder.

(R. 91, 92). The road is straight and

relatively flat for a substantial distance in both
directions from the point of the accident.
The Sandovals were traveling in a four-wheel
drive Blazer headed for Page, Arizona.
Virginia Sandoval.

The driver was

Mrs. Sandoval pulled her vehicle out of

the travel lane and stopped in the emergency lane.

When

her husband, Wayne Sandoval, was asked whether the car was
parked on the hard surface part of the roadway or upon the
graveled shoulder, Mr. Sandoval responded, "It was about
half and half, the shoulder and the gravel or dirt."
(R. 28-29) .
There was very little traffic on the roadway.
Wayne Sandoval testified that he was at the accident
scene for at least an hour, during which time only three or
four vehicles passed the accident scene.

(R. 64-65).

Mr. Sandoval characterized the scene of the accident as
being "out in the middle of nowhere."
-3-

(R. 65).

Wayne Sandoval testified that the last time he
saw his wifef Virginia Sandoval, prior to seeing her laying
in the roadway after having been struck by the Smith automobile , she was in a safe position on the north side of the
highway.

At the same time he also noticed the lights

of the Smith vehicle approaching from the west towards the
spot where Virginia Sandoval was eventually struck.

Wayne

Sandoval estimated that the Smith vehicle was approximately
600 feet away.

(R. 62).

Mrs. Sandoval was wearing a brown vest, a darkish
beige blouse, and blue jeans at the time of the accident.
(R. 290).
Leo Blatter, a passenger in the Sandoval vehicle
told the investigating officers that Wayne and his wife,
Virginia, had been drinking quite a bit, and from what he
observed, it looked like Virginia walked out in front of
the Smith vehicle.

(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 31, introduced

and accepted by stipulation of counsel.)
Mr. Phil Ellsworth, an eye witness to the
incident, gave the following statement which was read into
the record.

(R. 81).

MR. ELLIS: Now, as you approached, can
you tell us what you recall seeing.
MR. ELLSWORTH: Yes. I was heading
down the highway and I noticed a vehicle with its
light flashing on the side of the road and then I
noticed the headlights of the other vehicle
coming towards me and then, like I said, when I
was between 200-300 yards away approximately
-4-

from the vehicle with the flashing lights, the
car that was coming towards me moved out toward
the middle of the highway to go around itf you
know, giving it some clearance. And I was
still a considerable distance away, and then it
drove • . .
MR. IVIE:

You mean it moved . . .

MR. ELLSWORTH:
center line.
MR. IVIE:

It moved towards the

Away from the side of the

road.
MR. ELLSWORTH: Correct, away from the
side of the road where the vehicle had its lights
flashing to give it some clearancef then, all of
a sudden, just before the impact occurred, I saw
a person standing in the, what looked like right
in the middle of the road. And then quickly the
vehicle that was coming towards me swerved back
towards the right, towards the side of the road
where the car was parked, because the person was
standing right in the middle of the road and the
car coming towards me wasn't centered on the
highway, but it was giving it some berth.
MR. ELLIS: So the driver of the car
appeared to you to have seen the pedestrian?
MR. ELLSWORTH:
before impact . . .
MR. IVIE:

At the last second

And turned to the right.

MR. ELLSWORTH:

And turned to the right,

correct.
(R. 81 - Transcript of Recorded Statement of Phil Ellsworth,
p. 3).
Mrs. Smith testified that she was driving east on
U.S. 89, when some distance away, maybe a block or a block
and a half, she saw a vehicle on her right when her headlights hit the reflection of the tail lights.
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(R. 97).

Mrs. Smith's travel speed was approximately 45
miles per hour prior to seeing the stopped vehicle on the
side of the road.

After seeing the parked vehicle, she

slowed her car from 45 to 40 miles per hour.

(R. 101).

As Mrs. Smith proceeded to pass the parked
vehiclef all of a sudden there was someone in front of her
car.

At the same instant, another car was approaching from

the opposite direction with its1 high beam headlights on
which blinded Mrs. Smith.

Upon seeing someone standing in

the middle of the roadf she immediately swerved her car
to the right of avoid hitting the person in the road.
(R. 97-98).
Mrs. Smithfs car struck Mrs. Sandoval between the
corner of the driver's side headlight and the side mirror.
(R. 101). Mrs. Sandoval subsequently died as a result of her
injuries.
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT
1.

The evidence presented at trial, viewed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
could not support a reasonable inference that
defendant breached a duty of due care.

2.

Defendant did not violate a statutory duty of
care, and her conduct as supported by
undisputed evidence was in conformance with
the statutory standards of conduct.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE RULED CORRECTLY IN DETERMINING THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT,
THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER ON
THE ISSUE, AND THEREFORE A DIRECTED VERDICT
FOR THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPER.
In order for a plaintiff to have a negligence
action submitted for consideration by the jury, a plaintiff
must present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case against the defendant.

If the plaintiff fails to do

so, the defendant is entitled to have the verdict directed
in his favor.

Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed. 497 P.2d 28

(Utah 1972).
The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
specifically grounded upon the plaintiffs1 failure to
establish a prima facie case of negligence as against the
respondent.

(R. 146) .

The standard governing a trial

court's granting of a directed verdict is that "as a matter
of law, reasonable minds would not differ on the fact to be
determined from the evidence presented."

Management

Committee of Graystone ?ine goroeowner? on behalf of Owners
of Condominiums v. Graystone Pines. I n c . 652 P.2d 896
(Utah 1982).
It is respectfully submitted that from the record
on appeal, as well as from the evidence presented at trial,
that reasonable minds could not differ on the question of
the defendant's negligence.
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Initially, it is important to make an observation
concerning comparative negligence in the present case.

It

is respondent's contention, and apparently the position of
the trial court, that the directed verdict was mandated by
the failure to prove a breach of any duty by the defendant
towards the plaintiffs.

Quite simply, the evidence when

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs fails
to demonstrate that the defendant could have avoided this
accident through the exercise of due care.
However, in addition to examining the evidence
concerning defendant's conduct, it is also important to
examine the conduct of plaintiffs' decedent,

Respondent

would contend that the trial court would have been
justified in directing a verdict on the basis that
reasonable minds could not differ that the negligence of
plaintiffs' decedent was the primary if not the sole
proximate cause of this collision.

However, the trial

court did not find it necessary to compare fault in the
present case.

Rather, the trial court clearly found that

regardless of Mrs. Sandoval's acts in contributing to her
own death, the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate
negligence on behalf of the defendant which may have in
any way contributed to the accident.
However, it is important to note that the conduct
of Virginia Sandoval is still critical in reviewing the
trial court's decision concerning the conduct of defendant
-8-

Smith.

Quite simply, if any negligence is to be attributed

to the defendant, it must arise out of defendant's
perception of and reaction to the danger created when
Mrs, Sandoval walked in front of the defendant's oncoming
vehicle.
The evidence in this regard is uncontroverted.
In this respect, it should be noted that only one eye
witness observed Virginia Sandoval from the time she was in
her position of safety on the side of the roadway until the
point of impact near the center of the road.

Plaintiffs'

counsel introduced the statement of Leo Blatter, a
hitchhiker who was traveling with the Sandoval family.

His

statement observed that the decedent had been drinking
quite a bit prior to the accident, and simply walked in
front of Mrs. Smith's oncoming car.
The other witnesses at the scene, while not
observing the decedent's progress from the side of the road
to the point of impact, corroborated the statement of
witness Blatter.

The decedent's husband testified that he

did not see the collision near the center of the highway,
but saw the decedent seconds before standing in a safe
position on the far shoulder of the road.

Mr. Phil

Ellsworth, the driver of a vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction as defendant, did not see the decedent
by the side of the roadf but first saw her as her
silhouette crossed in front of the headlights on the Smith
-9-

vehicle.

Mrs. Smith, the defendantf testified that the

decedent suddenly appeared in front of her vehiclef that
she immediately swerved her car to the right to avoid the
person in the road, but was unable at that time to
successfully complete the evasive maneuver,,
The evidence is therefore uncontroverted that
Virginia Sandoval was at first in a position of safety off
the side of the roadway as indicated by her husband and the
hitchhiker, Leo Blatter.

As Mr. Blatter further observed,

she left that place of safety and walked in front of the
defendant's vehicle where she was then observed an instant
before impact by Mr. Ellsworth and Mrs. Smith.
Beyond the implications of comparative
negligence, these facts demonstrate the emergency which
confronted defendant.

In this regard, the record is

void of any evidence indicating that Mrs. Smith could
have avoided the emergency through the exercise of due
care.
In Point II below, the respondent answers
appellants' contentions that the defendant had violated
statutory duties of due care.

It appears clear that

Mrs. Smith at all times conducted herself in conformance
with the statutory mandates.

However, respondent goes

further in this point, and contends that even in the
absence of statutory violations the record demonstrates
that plaintiffs failed to show a violation of any duty,
-10-

whether founded on statute or the traditional concept of
reasonableness.
The uncontroverted evidence presented at trial
clearly showed that Mrs, Sandoval did not enter the zone of
danger until just before the collision occurred.

The

defendant testified that the moment she saw Mrs. Sandoval
at her position directly in front of the defendants
oncoming vehicle, she initiated her evasive maneuver.
Plaintiffs produced no evidence upon which a jury could
speculate that Mrs. Smith could have observed the decedent
in time for an evasive action to be successful.
Finally, the fact having been established that
the decedent walked from her position of safety to in front
of the defendant's vehicle, raises one further question.
Should the defendant be charged with the duty of
anticipating such conduct by others.

It must first of all

be reiterated that there is no evidence which would
indicate the defendant could have observed the decedent
prior to the time when she in fact did.

The uncontroverted

facts are that the decedent was wearing dark clothing on a
dark night, that she had dark hair and skin, and that the
defendant's ability to perceive was somewhat impaired by
the lights of the oncoming vehicle driven by witness
Ellsworth.
However, even assuming that the decedent could
have been observed earlier, more must be shown to establish
-11-

negligence on behalf of the defendant.

Surelyf the law

does not impose a duty upon motorists to reduce their speed
to one or two miles per hour whenever a pedestrian is or
may be in the area.

The law of Utah assumes, as does the

reasonable driver, that pedestrians and other individuals
on or near our highways will conduct themselves in due
regard for their own safety.

(As respondent indicates in

Point II of this brief, Utah law has long recognized such a

presumption.

£ae. Bryant v. Bingham Stage Liner 208 P. 541

(Utah 1922); Mackey v. Harvey. 572 P.2d 382 (Utah 1977).)
Rather, any duty imposed upon Mrs. Smith arises when it
becomes clear that a party is acting without regard to
personal safety, and appears to be placing themselves in a
position of danger.

Until such time, the reasonable person

assumes, and the law recognizes, that individuals will act
to prevent danger to themselves or others.
In the present case, the only evidence presented
on this question is the statement of the hitchhiker who
observed the decedent walk out in front of the defendant's
vehicle.

The record is void of any evidence which would

support an inference that the defendant had time to avoid
the accident once it could be observed that the decedent
was no.t only walking upon the roadway, but crossing
directly in front of an oncoming vehicle.

The trial court

has a duty "to be guided by credible, uncontradicted
evidence when all reasonable minds would accept it."
-12-

DeVas

v. Noble. 369 P.2d 290 at 293 (Utah 1962).

The trial

court's granting of a directed verdict pursuant to the
evidence therefore appears proper.
This Court has previously stated that they will
sustain the granting of a motion for a directed verdict
only if the evidence is such that reasonable men cannot
arrive at a different conclusion.
513 P.2d 432 (Utah 1973).

Anderson v. Gribble.

In the case at bar, the trial

judge examined the evidence presented by the plaintiff and
ruled that as a matter of law that the defendant was not
negligent.

The judge summarized his findings of fact and

law as follows:
Based upon the eye witness accounts
of the accident which resulted in the death
of the plaintifffs wife and the mother of
the three children of the plaintiff which
accounts are related by the defendant Mr.
Phil Ellsworth driver of the oncoming
vehicle and Mr. Leo Blatter, the
hitch-hiker, the court finds that reasonable
minds cannot differ on the issue of whether
the defendant was negligent. The facts are
that defendant was traveling about 45 miles
per hour, had decelerated to 40 miles per
hour, had taken precautions to clear the
plaintiff's vehicle which was parked on the
right shoulder of the road, that it was dark
and that there was a vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction when the
decedent was struck near the center of the
road by the vehicle driven by the defendant.
The portion of the vehicle striking the
decedent was the left front near the
headlight and the left mirror. At or about
the time of impact the defendant attempted
to swerve to the right to avoid the
collision. Based upon the foregoing and
considering particularly the statement of
Mr. Blatter, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31,
-13-

that it looked like the decedent walked out
in front of the defendant's car, the court
finds that as a matter of law the defendant
was not negligence and reasonable minds
cannot differ on this issue. Accordingly,
the defendant's Motion for a Directed
Verdict is granted.
(R. 150-151).
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FAILED TO ESTABLISH A
BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY BY DEFENDANT.
An action sounding in negligence is of course
governed by the standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances.

A breach of the duty of reasonableness need

not involve a violation of a statutory duty in order to
impose liability upon the defendant.

Defendant has

attempted in Point I of this brief to establish that
reasonable minds could not have differed upon reviewing the
evidence at trial, in concluding that defendant at all
times conducted herself reasonably.

However, the thrust of

plaintiffs' brief on appeal is that defendant violated
various statutory duties which would permit the action to
be submitted to the jury pursuant to a presumption.

In

Point II, defendant responds to plaintiffs' statutory
arguments in the order presented on appeal.

As is

demonstrated below, defendant's conduct as established by
uncontroverted evidence, either fails to fall within the
statute cited by plaintiff, or is clearly controlled by
statutory exceptions.

However, it is defendant's position
-14-

that not only was she innocent of violating statutory
duties, but at all times conducted herself in conformance
with the more general standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances.
A.

THE DEFENDANT'S/RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS
FALL CLEARLY WITHIN THE EXCEPTION TO
THE STATUTORY DUTY TO DRIVE ON THE
RIGHT SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY UNDER
SECTION 41-6-53 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953) , AS AMENDED.

Plaintiffs contend that the defendant violated a
statutory duty to drive her vehicle on the right hand side
of the roadway.

It should be noted from the outset that

competent evidence failed to establish that at any time
defendant moved her vehicle left of center on the roadway
where the accident occurred.

Despite the presence of eye

witnesses at the scene, the only suggestion of that
possibility came from defendant.

Her testimony indicates

that while she moved to the left hand side of her lane to
avoid the Sandoval vehicle parked on the side of the road,
she could not state that at any time she crossed over the
center of the highway.

The sole basis for plaintiffs'

contention is the defendant's admission that she may have
possibly been as much as one single foot over the center
line of the highway prior to making contact with the
pedestrian decedent.

The testimony of the oncoming driver

further indicates that Mrs. Smith swerved to the right
prior to impact.

Defendant submits that the testimony

-15-

taken as a whole fails to provide evidence which would
permit reasonable minds to speculate on defendant's
possible breach of a duty of due care.

However, it is also

clear that defendant's conduct does not establish a
violation of statute as alleged by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs/appellants cite as a statutory duty
Section 41-6-53, Utah Code Annotated.

That statute

provides:
Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a
vehicle shall be driven upon the right half
of the roadway, except as follows: . . .
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-53 (1953), as amended.
Plaintiffs' brief then dismisses all exceptions
to the statute claiming that:
application here."

"none of which have any

However, one of these exceptions is

directly applicable:
(2) When an obstruction exists making it
necessary to drive to the left of the center
of the roadway; provided any person so
doing shall yield the right of way to all
vehicles traveling in the proper direction
upon the unobstructed portions of the
highway within such a distance as to
constitute an immediate hazard;
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-53 (2) (1953), as amended.
The testimony at trial was uncontroverted
concerning the obstruction on the side of the roadway
caused by the Sandoval vehicle.

Defendant's conduct in

moving over within her lane, with the possibility that she
may have crossed over into the oncoming lane by at most one

-16-

foot, is wholly consistent with the statutory exception
outlined above.

Surely, her actions are consistent with

the concept of reasonableness under the circumstances.
Where obstructions exist on the roadway, a driver is
obviously not required by statute to proceed through the
obstruction or not at all. Defendant conducted herself in
accordance with the statutory mandate by avoiding the
obstruction while avoiding danger to oncoming vehicles.
Furthermore, the pedestrian, plaintiffs1
decedent, does not fall within the class of individuals
protected by this statutory mandate.

The duty owed to

plaintiff, a pedestrian wearing dark clothing, who by the
only eye witness report walked from the side of the roadway
directly in front of the defendant's vehicle, was to avoid
injuring the plaintiff once the danger could be reasonably
perceived.
brief.

That duty is dealt with elsewhere in this

However, it is sufficient at this point to

indicate that statutory duty imposed by Section 41-6-53 was
not violated.
B.

THE DEFENDANT'S/RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS
DID NOT VIOLATE THE STATUTORY DUTY
ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS UNDER
SECTION 41-6-54, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953), AS AMENDED, WHICH IMPOSES A
DUTY UPON DRIVERS OF VEHICLES PASSING
IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS.

Plaintiffs also claim a violation of Section
41-6-54.

That section provides:

-17-

Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite
directions shall pass each other to the
right and upon roadways having width for
not more than one line of traffic in each
direction/ each driver shall give to the
other at least one-half of the main
traveled portion of the roadway as nearly
as possible.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-54 (1953), as amended.
This provision is applicable only in situations
when drivers of passing vehicles are going in opposite
directions.

The facts of this case clearly indicate that

this was not the situation.

Ratherf the plaintiffs1

vehicle was parked in the roadway heading the same
direction as the defendant's vehicle in the same lane of
traffic.

The plaintiffs1 vehicle and the defendant's

vehicle were simply not "vehicles proceeding in opposite
directions".
amended.

Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-54 (1953), as

Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the

statute relied 'upon by appellant was not intended to govern
this particular factual setting.
Furthermore/ it is important to note that the
statutory section provides that the described conduct by
drivers shall be carried out "as nearly as possible".
Code Ann. Section 41-6-54 (1953) , as amended.

Utah

Once againf

the question relates to a duty of reasonableness.

Under

the circumstances as indicated by uncontroverted evidence,
it is obvious that defendant's actions were reasonable in
light of the hazard created by the Sandoval vehicle.

-18-

Furthermore, defendant's actions in attempting to avoid the
pedestrian once the pedestrian became observable
appear clearly in conformance with the statutory mandate,
as well as the more general standard of reasonableness,
C.

THE DEFENDANT'S/RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS
WERE REASONABLY WITHIN THE EXCEPTION
TO THE STATUTORY DUTY ALLEGED BY THE
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS UNDER SECTION
41-6-61, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, WHICH
IMPOSES A DUTY TO DRIVE A VEHICLE
AS NEARLY AS PRACTICABLE WITHIN A
SINGLE LANE.

Plaintiffs1 claim a statutory duty based upon
Section 41-6-61, Utah Code Annotated.

This section is

concerned with driving a vehicle on the right-hand side of
the roadway.

The defendant would like to draw the court's

attention to the language of subsection (1) which states:
"A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely
within a single lane . . . (emphasis added).
Ann. Section 41-6-61 (1953) , as amended.

Utah Code

The highlighted

language clearly imposes a standard of reasonableness under
the circumstances.
The evidence presented at trial, even granting
all inferences to the plaintiffs, fails to demonstrate a
violation of this statutory duty or the general standard of
reasonableness.

Once again, the uncontroverted evidence

concerning the position of the Sandoval vehicle would not
permit reasonable minds to differ as to the wisdom of
defendant's actions in moving her vehicle to the left side
-19-

of her lane of travel, or even moving as much as a foot
over the center line of the highway.
Furthermore, there is no competent evidence in
the record which would support an inference that defendant
failed to perceive and react to the presence of plaintiffs1
decedent until it was possible to do so.

Indeedf the

evidence concerning Mrs. Sandoval's dark clothing, the
headlights of the oncoming vehicle, and Mrs. Smith's
evasive maneuver immediately prior to impact, clearly
indicates that the defendant conducted herself in a
vigilant manner.
Furthermore, the uncontroverted evidence of the
only eye witness who saw Mrs. Sandoval move from the side
of the roadway to the eventual point of impact would
further support the trial court's granting of a directed
verdict in this regard.

The statement of the hitchhiker

indicated that Mrs. Sandoval walked directly in front of
the defendant's vehicle.

Because the decedent was moving

from the side of the roadway during the moments prior to
impact, she would not have reached her position in front of
the defendant's vehicle until just shortly before the
impact occurred.

The uncontroverted evidence concerning

the defendant's attempted and evasive maneuver would lead
reasonable minds to one conclusion; that the defendant
observed the decedent as she entered the zone of danger and
reacted immediately to avoid the danger.
-20-

Once again, there

are no facts in the record to establish a breach of the
statutory duty, or the standard of reasonableness.
D.

THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT WAS DRIVING
AT A SAFE AND APPROPRIATE SPEED UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Appellants cite Section 41-1-46, for the
contention that the defendant was driving at an excessive
rate of speed in light of actual or potential hazards then
existing.

The evidence in this case was uncontroverted

that defendant was at all times operating her vehicle
within the speed limit established for the highway.

The

evidence further established the traffic on the highway was
sparse, but that defendant immediately decelerated upon
observing the Sandoval vehicle.
Once again, the evidence related in the
hitchhiker's statement, establishing that the decedent
walked directly in front of the defendant's vehicle is
important.

The testimony is uncontroverted that

plaintiffs' decedent was walking from the side of the
roadway towards the point of impact immediately prior to
the collision, and did not enter the zone of danger
immediately in front of the defendant's vehicle until just
before impact occurred.

Under these circumstances, there

can be no controversy that once plaintiffs' decedent had
created the danger, the defendant had no time reduce her
speed so drastically that the collision could have been
avoided.
-21-

It is also important to note that had defendant
been able to observe the decedent at her point of safety on
the side of the roadway, the reasonable and prudent driver
would not anticipate that the pedestrian would then
disregard her own safety and step out in front of the
moving vehicle.

This fact, while appearing quite obvious,

has long been recognized as the law in the State of Utah.

Sryant Y . Bingham Stage Liner 208 p. 541 (Utah 1922);
Mackey v. Harvey/ 572 P.2d 382 (Utah 1977).
The standard of conduct has been embodied in
Utah's standard jury instructions as follows:
A person who is observing due care for
his own safety, has a right to assume
that another is possessed of normal
faculties of sight and hearing and that
they will use them in exercising ordinary
care for their own safety and the safety
of others; and he has the right to rely on
that assumption unless, in the exercise
of due care, he observes or should observe
something to warn him to the contrary.
Jury Instruction Forms of Utah (J.I.P.U.), No. 16.10.
Therefore, it is clear that the statutory duty
referred to here was not applicable in light of the
undisputed facts.

Defendant operated her vehicle within

the speed limit, reduced the speed of her vehicle as soon
as she observed the hazard presented by the Sandoval
vehicle, and clearly observed Mrs. Sandoval as soon as it
was possible to perceive that Mrs. Sandoval was placing
herself in an area of obvious danger.
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CONCLUSION
While respondent readily admits that a directed
verdict in a negligence action is rare, it is equally clear
that the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff must demonstrate some factual basis upon
which reasonable minds could find a violation of a duty
owed to the plaintiff.

It is clear that the trial court

here applied the appropriate standard in granting a
directed verdict, and upon a review of the evidence it is
respectfully submitted that the present case presents just
such an instance when a directed verdict should properly be
granted.

Defendant would therefore request that the

directed verdict entered by the trial court be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/fr

^"^J

January, 1986.

day of
^—\

L^tfAPHILLIPS
IVIE
IVIE & YOUNG

Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
/
/
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RAY HARDING IVIE
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN TBE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WAYNE SANDOVAL, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
his minor children, LAVATO
SANDOVAL, SHAWNIELLE SANDOVAL
and DANIELLE SANDOVAL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

:
:
:

ENTRY OF DIRECTED VERDICT
NUNC PRO TUNC AND JUDGMENT

:
:

IDA TSOSIE SMITH,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. 66,555

:

The above-entitled matter came on regularly and duly
before the Court for trial on the 1st and 2nd days of April,
1985, the Honorable David Sam presiding.

The parties were

present and represented by counsel, Glen J. Ellis appearing on
behalf of plaintiffs and Ray Barding Ivie appearing for
defendant.
Following the close of plaintiffs' case and
plaintiffs' having rested, defendant moved the Court for a
directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

The Court having considered the evidence

presented in the light most favorable to plaintiffs in
concluding that reasonable minds would not differ in their
determination from the evidence presented that plaintiffs had
failed to prove the prima facia element of negligence, the
Court thereby ruled as a matter of law that defendant's motion
pursuant to Rule 50(a) for a directed verdict must be granted.
The Court having dismissed the jury prior to the formality of
signing a verdict in favor of defendant, now hereby enters a
verdict nunc pro tunc in favor of defendant and against
plaintiffs, no cause for action.
DATED AND SIGNED this

/-/

day of April, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

O^u^^^
DAVID SAM
District Judge
JPPSMENT
The Court having entered a verdict nunc pro tunc as
above set forth now makes and enters the following judgment:
Defendant is hereby awarded a judgment as against
plaintiffs, no cause for action.
S~J

DATED AND SIGNED this

day of April, 1985.

BY TBE COURT:

_. JuL^cA^^C"- ^ s r ^

DAVID SAM
District Judge
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(2) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished upon
a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than five days
nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than
$299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second or subsequent
conviction, the person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
ten days nor more than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor
more than $299 or by both such fine and imprisonment.
History: L 1941, ch. 52, §35; C. 1943,
57-7-112; L 1978, ch. 33, § 9.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1978 amendment deleted "or on a conviction under this section subsequent to a
conviction under an ordinance as provided in
section 41-6-43(b)" after "subsequent conviction" near the beginning of the second sentence of subsec. (2); substituted "$299" for
"$1,000" near the end of subsec (2); deleted
the last two sentences of subsec (2) which
provided that second violation had to occur
within three years of the preceding violation
and for suspension of license by department;
and made minor changes in phraseology and
style.
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey
(1925) 65 U 609, 239 P 25, 44 ALR 558,
reviewed in State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U
63,157 P 2d 258.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <£=> 330.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §5 609-624.
Reckless driving, 7A AmJur 2d 499 et seq.,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §312 et
seq.

"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius
of lights" application of doctrine to accident
involving pedestrian crossing street or highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424.
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for automobiles, 29 ALR 883.
Homicide or assault in connection with
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99
ALR 756.
Liability of one fleeing police for injury
resulting from collision of police vehicle with
another vehicle, person, or object, 51 ALR 3d
1226.
"Residence district," "business district,"
"school area," and the like, in statutes and
ordinances regulating speed of motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343.
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; definiteness and certainty, 12 ALR 2d 580.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes specifically directed against
racing of automobiles on public streets or
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286.
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding
running of automobile so as to inflict damage
or injury, 47 ALR 255.
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 ALR
1273, 52 ALR 2d 1337.
When automobile is under control, 28 ALR
952.

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
Section
41-6-46.

Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and
curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor.
41-6-47.
Prima facie limit
41-6-48.
Speed Restrictions — Powers of local authorities.
41-6-49.
Minimum speed regulations.
41-6-50.
Special speed limit on bridges — Prima facie evidence.
41-6-51.
Speed contest or exhibition on highway — Barricade or obstruction therefor.
41-6-52.
Violation - Pleading.
41-6-52.1. Repealed.

41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at intersections, crossings, and curves — Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor. (1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a
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speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent
with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing,
when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest,
when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special
hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) Twenty miles per hour.
*
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete stop
before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods.
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any urban district.
(c) Fifty-five miles per hour in other locations.
The speed limits set forth in this section may be altered as authorized
in subsection (3) and sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48.
(3) The governor by proclamation, in time of war or emergency, may
change the speed on the highways of the state.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-46, enacted by L.
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, 51.
Compiler's Notes.
Laws 1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 1 repealed old
section 41-6-46 (L 1941, ch. 52, § 36; C. 1943,
57-7-113; L. 1951, ch. 72, § 1; 1957, ch. 76, § 1;
1959, ch 66, 51; 1978, ch. 34, 51), relating to
speed regulations, and enacted new section
41-6-46.
Title of Act.
An act repealing and re-enacting section
41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended by chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1957,
as amended by chapter 66, Laws of Utah
1959, as amended by chapter 34, Laws of
Utah 1978, and section 41-2-19, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 85,
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter
34, Laws of Utah 1978; relating to highway
speeds and points for certain speeding
offenses, providing for maximum speeds; providing for suspensions of licenses for certain
offenses; providing for the assessment of
points for certain violations and the basis for
and effect of such points; providing for new
licensure after suspension, and providing for
hearings and re-examinations. — Laws 1978
(2nd S.S.), ch. 9.

Cross-References.
Municipal regulations, 10-8-30.
Reckless driving, 41-6-45.
Construction and application.
This section requires that driver shall not
drive at speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent in view of existing conditions and
hazards on highway, that his speed shall be
controlled so as to avoid colliding with other
vehicles entering or upon highway in lawful
manner, and that speed shall be appropriately reduced when special hazards exist
with respect to other traffic or by reason of
weather conditions. Horsley v. Robinson
(1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592.
Constitutionality.
A former speed law was held constitutional
as against contention that it violated Const
Art. VI, { 23. State v. Brown (1928) 75 U 37,
282 P 785.
Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist charged with
speeding under this section does not bar
subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Thatcher (1945) 108 U 63,
157 P 2d 258.
Instructions.
In action arising out of car-pedestrian accident in California, evidence did not justify
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negligence. Lochhead v. Jensen (1912) 42 U
99,129 P 347.
Violation of speed regulations may constitute negligence per se. Jensen v. Utah Light
& Railway Co. (1913) 42 U 415,132 P 8.
Operating a motor vehicle at less than the
lawful maximum speed may constitute negligence under given circumstances. Fowkes v.
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1915) 46 U
502,151 P 53. *
It has long been the rule in this state that
it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an
automobile upon a traveled public highway
at such rate of speed that said automobile
cannot be stopped within distance at which
operator of said car is able to see objects
upon highway in front of him. Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products Co. (1932) 80 U 331,
15 P 2d 309.
When a driver upon a public highway with
his light equipment cannot see more than 50
feet ahead of him, it is his duty to drive at
such speed as will enable him to stop within
Motor carriers and buses.
that distance. Hansen v. Clyde (1936) 89 U 31,
Driver of vehicle carrying passengers for 56 P 2d 1366,104 ALR 943.
For general discussion as to speed and civil
hire owes them duty to operate vehicle
within such rate of speed as reasonably pru- liability with respect thereto, see opinions by
dent person would operate under existing Wade, Wolfe and Pratt, JJ., in Horsley v.
conditions, and, where road and weather con- Robinson (1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592.
Where fog was so great that visibility was
ditions make driving hazardous, reasonable
prudence requires proportionate increase in limited to 20 or 25 feet and a safe speed
care of driver to avoid injury to passengers. . under those conditions was about five miles
Horsley v. Robinson (1947) 112 U 227, 186 P per hour, the court cannot say as a matter of
law that the plaintiff was not negligent in
2d 592.
Where bus, while traveling between 20 and operating his car at the rate of 25 miles per
50 miles per hour under very hazardous con- hour. Shields v. Ramon (1952) 122 U 474, 251
ditions on outside lane of main highway P 2d 671.
What is a reasonable and prudent speed
which was covered with ice and slush, collided with automobile approaching from under the conditions and having regard to
opposite direction which went out of control the actual and potential hazards then existand skidded into path of bus, and distance ing is a matter about which there is room for
between bus and automobile, when it first reasonable disagreement and such being the
became discernible that latter was oat of case, a jury question is presented. Lodder v.
control, was between 30 and 330 feet, evi- Western Pac R. Co. (1953) 123 U 316, 259 P
dence was sufficient to sustain verdict in 2d 589.
Driving in excess of speed limit may confavor of injured bus passenger for hire as
against bus company, in that jury could con- stitute prima facie evidence of negligence,
clude therefrom that bus driver was negli- but does not constitute conclusive evidence.
gent in operating bus at excessive rate of Cardon v. Brenchley (1978) 575 P 2d 184.
speed under such circumstances, which was Pleadings and proceedings.
proximate cause of collision. Horsley v.
If the complaint is fatally defective in its
Robinson (1947) 112 U 227,186 P 2d 592.
allegations when viewed as an attempt to
bring defendant within the provisions of this
Negligence.
section, judgment for plaintiff will be
Ordinarily it is not negligence to operate a reversed. Woodward v. Spring Canyon Coal
motor vehicle within the speed limit pre- Co. (1936) 90 U 578, 63 P 2d 267.
scribed by statute or ordinance, although a
jury may say in some instances, dependent Questions of law and fact.
upon the particular attendant facts and cirWhether the speed at which the vehicle
cumstances, that the operation of an automo- was going at the time was the proximate
bile within prescribed limit is nevertheless cause of the accident is a question of fact.
instruction that defendant had duty to drive
car in conformity with California statute
providing that no person shall drive vehicle
at speed greater than is reasonable and prudent, where there was no evidence that '
defendant's speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour
was excessive or unreasonable. (Deering's
Cal. Vehicle Code § 510.) Hunter v. Michaelis
(1948) 114 U 242,198 P 2d 245.
Where defendant failed to see small child
in the street until it was too late to avoid
striking him, the trial court should have
instructed jury that driver is charged with
duty of seeing what he would have seen had
he been exercising reasonable care, since evidence showed motorist should have seen the
child much sooner, instructing jury on right
to assume others will perform their legal
duties and on sudden or unexpected situation
arising without fault on defendant's part was
reversible error. Solt v. Godfrey (1971) 25 U
2d 210, 479 P 2d 474.
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Sweet v. Salt Lake City (1913) 43 U 306,134 P
1167.
In action arising out of intersection collision, evidence sufficiently established prima
facie case of negligence on part of defendant
in failing to yield right-of-way and in traveling at excessive rate of speed, and contributory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing
to keep proper lookout and in traveling at
excessive rate of speed was for jury. Martin
v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478,189 P 2d 127.
In action against motorist for death of
decedent, who was killed while hitching
small tractor to rear of an automobile, it was
a question of fact for the jury whether
motorist was negligent in failing to reduce
her speed below 50 miles per hour when she
saw wrecker ahead of her on the highway.
Taylor v. Johnson (1964) 15 U 2d 342, 393 P
2d382.
Collateral References,
Automobiles €=> 331.
61A CJS Motor Vehicles §§ 641-650.
Speed, 7A AmJur 2d 394 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 218 et seq.
Application of "assured clear distance
ahead'* or "radius of lights" doctrine to accident involving pedestrian crossing street or
highway, 31 ALR 2d 1424.
"Assured clear distance" statute or rule as
applied at hill or curve, 133 ALR 967.
Competency of nonexpert's testimony
based on sound alone as to speed of motor
vehicle involved in accident, 33 ALR 3d 1405.
Conflict between statutes and local regulations as to speed, 21 ALR 1187, 64 ALR 994,
147 ALR 529.
Criminal or penal responsibility of public
officer or employee for violating speed regulations, 9 ALR 367.
Driving at illegal speed as reckless driving
within statute making reckless driving a

criminal offense, 86 ALR 1281, 52 ALR 2d
1337.
Driving automobile at a speed which prevents stopping within length of vision as
negligence, 44 ALR 1403, 58 ALR 1493, 87
ALR 900, 97 ALR 546
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for automobiles, 29 ALR 883.
Expert opinion evidence of speed not based
upon view of vehicle, 156 ALR 382.
Homicide or assault in connection with
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 99
ALR 756.
Indefiniteness of automobile speed regulations as affecting validity, 6 ALR 3d 1326.
Indictment or information which charges
offense as to speed in language of statute, 115
ALR 357.
Liability of public authority for injury
arising out of automobile race conducted on
street or highway, 80 ALR 3d 1192.
Meaning of "residence district," "business
district," "school area," and the like, in statutes and ordinances regulating speed of
motor vehicles, 50 ALR 2d 343.
Opinion testimony as to speed of motor
vehicle based on skid marks and other facts,
29 ALR 3d 248.
Proof, by radar or other mechanical or
electronic devices, of violation of speed regulations, 47 ALR 3d 822.
Public officers or employees as bound by
speed regulations, 19 ALR 459, 23 ALR 418.
Speeding prosecution based on observation
from aircraft, 23 ALR 3d 1446.
Validity, construction, and application of
criminal statutes specifically directed against
racing of automobiles on public streets or
highways (drag racing), 24 ALR 3d 1286.
Violation of speed law as affecting
violator's right to recover for negligence, 12
ALR 463.
Violation of speed regulations as affecting
rights to recover for injuries due to collision
with streetcar, 28 ALR 228, 46 ALR 1008.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
National emergency.
"National emergency" as used in former
provision authorizing governor to change
speed limit by proclamation meant an
unforeseen combination of circumstances
calling for immediate action by national
leaders and support from citizens for the
safety, peace, health and general welfare of
the nation; the 1973 Arab oil embargo was
such an emergency and governor could
validly reduce state-wide speed limit to 55

miles per hour by proclamation. State v.
Poukas (1977) 560 P 2d 312.
Validly issued proclamation by governor
setting speed limit could be terminated by
governor's proclamation, by legislative
action, or by judicial holding that the circumstances had so changed that the proclamation could no longer serve any useful purpose; governor's proclamation limiting speed
limit to 55 miles per hour had not been
terminated as of December 2, 1976. In re
Prisbrey (1978) 576 P 2d 1278.
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41-6-52. Violation — Pleading, (a) In every charge of violation of any
speed regulation in this act the complaint, also the summons or notice to
appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have
driven, also the prima facie speed applicable within the district or at the
location.
(b) The provisions of this act declaring prima facie speed limitations
shall not be construed to relieve the plaintiff in any civil action from the
burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant as the proximate
cause of an accident.
History: L 1941, ch. 52, §42; C. 1943,
57-7-119.
Collateral References.
Automobiles G=> 351.

61A CJS Motor Vehicles { 588.
7A AmJur 2d 406, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 231.

41-6-52.1. Repealed.
Repeal.
Section 41-6-52.1 (L. 1957, ch. 77, § 2), relating to resume speed road signs, was repealed
by Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 61.
ARTICLE 7
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE m DRIVING ON
RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVERTAKING, PASSING
AND OTH&2 RULES OF THE ROAD
Section
41-6-53.
41-6-54.
41-6-55.
41-6-56.
41-6-57.
41-6-58.
41-6-59.
41-6-60.
41-6-61.
41-6-62.

Duty to drive on right side of highway — Exceptions.
Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions.
Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction.
Passing upon right — When permissible.
Limitation on passing.
Limitations on driving on left side of road — Exceptions.
Signs and markings on roadway — No passing zones — Exceptions.
One-way traffic — Signs.
Roadway divided into marked lanes — Rules — Traffic-control devices.
Following another vehicle — Proximity and distance — Caravan or motorcade
— Exception for funeral procession.
41-6-63.
Repealed.
41-6-63.10. Highway divided into two separate roadways by dividing section — Unlawful
actions of drivers — Dividing section defined and described.
41-6-64.
Controlled-access highways — Driving upon and from highways.
41-6-65.
Controlled-access highways — Prohibiting use by class or kind of traffic — Traffic-control devices.

41-6-53. Duty to drive on right side of highway — Exceptions.
(a) Upon all roadways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon
the right half of the roadway, except as follows:
(1) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction under the rules governing such movement;
(2) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left
of the center of the roadway; provided any person so doing shall yield the
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right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions of the highway within such distance as to constitute an
immediate hazard;
(3) Upon a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under
the rules applicable thereon; or
(4) Upon a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
(b) Upon all roadways any vehicle proceeding at less than the normal
speed of traffic at the time and place under the conditions then existing
shall be driven in the right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close
as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except when
overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction
or when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or into a private road
or driveway.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, 543; C. 1943,
57-7-120; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
{14.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b).
The 1975 amendment rewrote subd. (aX2)
which read: MWhen the right half of a roadway is closed to traffic while under construction or repair."
Construction and application.
Where this section refers to "half the roadways," the reasonable interpretation of the
meaning of this term is that it means half of
the roadway as it exists at the time it is
being traveled and not half the roadway as it
may have been laid out originally. To this
effect see Dixon v. Alabam Freight Co. (1941)
57 Ark 173, 112 P 2d 584, in which the Arizona court construed sections similar to ours
as quoted above. Patton v. Kirkman (1946)
109 U 487,167 P 2d 282.
Backing.
Statutes requiring that vehicles keep to
right have no application to backing. Naisbitt
v. Eggett (1956) 5 U 2d 5, 295 P 2d 832.
Bicycle and truck.
Driver of autotruck who was on right side
of street and was not on, near to, or
approaching crossing where both vehicles
and pedestrians might pass either or both
ways, had right to relax his vigilance and
was not required to do more than to maintain such lookout as would prevent his colliding or coming in contact with anyone on his
side of street Richards v. Palace Laundry Co.
(1919) 55 U 409,186 P 439.
Effect of passing from right to center.
While in case street or highway is not used
by others one may drive on any part thereof,

yet, when motorist or bicyclist passes from
right to left of center of street, he loses some
of his rights, and may not be heard to complain of conduct of those who are on proper
side of street to same extent as though he
also were on proper side. Richards v. Palace
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409,186 P 439.
Instruction.
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile at intersection, instruction that motorist
had right to presume that every other person
would obey law by traveling on right-hand
side of road, and that no duty rested upon
motorist to stop or change course of automobile until he had reason to believe that plaintiff was traveling on wrong side of street,
was properly refused where it was disputed
question as to whether bicyclist was on
wrong side of roadway. Cheney v. Buck (1920)
56 U 29,189 P 81.
Where collision takes place upon street
having four traffic lanes, it is proper to
instruct as to duty of defendant to use right
traffic lane, and as to duty of the respective
parties to use lane 4 rather than lane 3,
where the evidence warrants such instruction. Thomas v. Sadleir (1945) 108 U 552, 162
P 2d 112, setting out instruction, embodying
this section of the Motor Vehicle Law and
the exceptions, and held to be nonprejudicial
and not objectionable as stating the last
clear chance doctrine.
Negligence.
The strongest kind of presumption of
negligence prevails against party driving on
wrong aide of road. Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1918) 52 U 426,174 P 821.
Where one who is operating his vehicle on
right-hand side of street makes survey of
condition of street ahead of him, and in

357

41-6-54

MOTOR VEHICLES

doing so he observes no one coming on his
side of street, but sees one or more coming
towards him on opposite side of street, he
has right to assume that such person will
continue onward on opposite side of street,
and not encroach upon his side. Richards v.
Palace Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P
439.
PresumptionIn action by bicyclist for injuries sustained
in collision with autotruck when plaintiff was
thrown in front of defendant's oncoming
vehicle, held driver of autotruck had legal
right to presume that plaintiff would not
encroach upon his side of street, and to hold
defendant liable, plaintiff was required to
prove more than mere fact that autotruck
could have been stopped or turned aside in
distance of 10 or 15 feet Richards v. Palace
Laundry Co. (1919) 55 U 409,186 P 439.
Questions of law and fact.
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile at intersection, whether bicyclist was on
right side of traveled road held for jury.
Cheney v. Buck (1920) 56 U 29,189 P 81.
In personal-injury action arising out of
automobile-truck collision on highway, ulti-

mate question of fact as to which of two drivers failed to keep his vehicle upon proper side
of road was for jury. Moser v. Zion's Co-op.
Mercantile Institution (1948) 114 U 58, 197 P
2d 136.
Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <£=> 153.
60A CJS Motor Vehicles } 268.
Portion of highway to be used; following,
approaching, and passing other vehicles, 7A
AmJur 2d 434 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 260 et seq.
Duties imposed by statute where motor
vehicle, passing on left of other vehicle proceeding in same direction, cuts back to the
right, 48 ALR 2d 233.
Right or duty to turn in violation of law of
road to avoid traveler or obstacle, 24 ALR
1304, 63 ALR 277,113 ALR 1328.
Validity of regulations as to part of street
to be used by moving vehicles, 29 ALR 1348.

41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite directions. Drivers
of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the
right and upon roadways having width for not more than one line of traffic
in each direction, each driver shall give to the other at least one-half of
the main traveled portion of the roadway as nearly as possible.
History:
57-7-121.

L. 1941, ch. 52, §44; C. 1943,

Construction and application.
Where this section refers to half the roadway, it means half of the roadway as it exists
at the time it is being traveled, and not half
the roadway as it may have been laid out
originally. Patton v. Kirkman (1946) 109 U
487, 167 P 2d 282, following Dixon v. Alabam
Freight Co. (1941) 57 Ariz 173, 112 P 2d 584,

construing similar section of the statutes of
that state.
Collateral Reference*.
Automobiles <S=* 170(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 306.
Vehicles proceeding in opposite directions,
7A AmJur 2d 442, Automobiles and Highway
Traffic § 265; 7A AmJur 2d 1100 et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 839 et seq.

41*6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in same direction. The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations,
exceptions, and special rules hereinafter stated:
(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall
not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the
overtaken vehicle.
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41-6-60. One-way traffic — Signs, (a) The department of transportation and local authorities may designate any highway, roadway, part of
a roadway or specific lanes under their respective jurisdictions upon which
vehicular traffic shall proceed in one direction at all or such times as shall
be indicated by official traffic-control devices.
(b) Upon a roadway so designated for one-way traffic, a vehicle shall
be driven only in the direction indicated by official traffic-control devices.
(c) A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be driven only
to the right of such island.
History: L 1941, ch. 52, § 50; C. 1943,
57-7-127; L 1969, ch. 109, § 1; 1979, ch. 242,
§ 15.
Com pile r'g Notes.
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section
which read: "(a) The state road commission
may designate any highway or any separate
roadway under its jurisdiction for one-way
traffic and shall erect appropriate signs
giving notice thereof, (b) Upon a roadway

designated and signposted for one-way traffic
a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction
designated."
^ e * ^ amendment substituted "department
o^transportation" for "state road comm i 9 8 1 0 n lD g u b s e c ( a )
* '
, »-«.,.«--«
r . . .
CoUmtcrmJ
«*wrenc«i.
Automobiles &=> 14.
60 CJS Motor Vehicles { 16.

41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes — Rules — Trafficcontrol devices. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more
clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others
consistent herewith shall apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a
single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
(2) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes and provides for
two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center
lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the
same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where such
center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same
direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated
by official traffic-control devices.
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified
traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by
traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, $51; C. 1943,
57-7-128; L 1949, ch. 65, t1; 1975, ch. 207,
i 18; 1978, ch. 33, J 14.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment substituted "two or
more" for "three or more- in the preliminary
paragraph.
The 1975 amendment inserted "and provides for two-way movement of traffic" in
subd. (b); substituted "traveling in the same

direction when such center lane is clear of
traffic within a safe distance" in subd. (b) for
"where the roadway is clearly visible and
§uc
^ c c n t e r lane is clear of traffic within a
^ d i s ^ " ^t*!**^^*?*
*!
designated by official traffic-control devices
ln
subd. (b) for "is signposted to give notice
°t »uch allocation"; rewrote subd. (c) which
read: "Official signs may be erected directing
slow-moving traffic to use s designated lane
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or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving
in the same direction and drivers of vehicles
shall obey the directions of every such sign";
and made minor changes in phraseology.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subds.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); and inserted "or completing" near the middle of subd. (2).

Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009.
Collateral References.
Automobiles &=> 153.
60A CJS Motor Vehicles 5 274.

41-6-62. Following another vehicle — Proximity and distance —
Caravan or motorcade — Exception for funeral procession. (1) The
driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is
reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
(2) The driver of any truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle
when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district
and which is following another truck or motor vehicle drawing another
vehicle shall, whenever conditions permit, leave sufficient space so that an
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy such space without danger, except
that this shall not prevent a truck or motor vehicle drawing another vehicle from overtaking and passing any vehicle or combinations of vehicles.
(3) Motor vehicles being driven upon any roadway outside of a business
or residence district in a caravan or motorcade whether or not towing
other vehicles shall be so operated as to allow sufficient space between each
such vehicle or combination of vehicles so as to enable any other vehicle
to enter and occupy such space without danger. This provision shall not
apply to funeral processions.
History: L 1941, ch. 52, §52; C. 1943,
57-7-129; L 1949, ch. 65, 51; 1975, ch. 207,
5 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted "or motor
vehicle" after "any truck" in subsec. (b); and
added subsec (c).
The 1975 amendment rewrote subsec (b)
which provided a distance requirement of 150
feet between truck or motor vehicle except
when passing.
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs.
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); inserted "so that an
overtaking vehicle may enter and occupy
such 8pace" in subsec. (2); and inserted
"drawing another vehicle" near the end of
subsec (2).

Violation as prima facie evidence of negligence.
Violations of standards of safety set by
statute are regarded as prima facie evidence
of negligence subject only to justification or
excuse. Platis v. United States (1968) 288 F
Supp 254, affirmed in 409 F 2d 1009.
Collateral References.
Automobiles <S=» 172(2).
60A CJS Motor Vehicles 5 326.
7A AmJur 2d 434-442, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic 55 260-265.
Reciprocal duties of drivers of automobiles
or other vehicles proceeding in the same
direction, 104 ALR 485.

41-6-63. Repealed.
Repeal
Section 41-6-63 (C. 1943, 57-7-129.10,
enacted by L 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78,
8 3; 1959, ch. 67, §1), relating to distinctive

roadway markings and prohibiting driving to
the left thereof, was repealed by Laws 1975,
ch. 207, 561. For present provisions, see
41-6-59.
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